A new Chinese heliport being constructed 20 kilometres east of the Line of Actual Control near the sensitive ‘Fishtails’ region of Arunachal Pradesh, may give Chinese armed forces the ability to speedily move in military resources into an under-developed, remote area along the Indo-Chinese frontier.

The heliport, images of which appear in this report, lies along the banks of the Gongrigabu Qu river in the Nyingchi Prefecture of the Tibet Autonomous Region. This is within Chinese territory that India does not dispute.

Open-source satellite imagery available on EOS Data Analytics shows that till December 1, 2023, there was no construction at the site where the heliport is being constructed. A subsequent satellite image dated December 31, shows land being cleared for construction. The latest Maxar-sourced high-resolution images, shot on September 16, indicate that the facility is in an advanced state of construction.

Geospatial intelligence experts such as Damien Symon who first highlighted the existence of the heliport point out that “this new heliport will allow the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to intensify intelligence-gathering, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities.” This closes logistical challenges in the densely forested region which features rugged mountains that make military movement cumbersome. The construction of the heliport “enables rapid troop deployment to distant areas, strengthening patrol efficiency and augmenting China’s overall military footprint in these strategically important, remote locations.”

Military sources who are monitoring the construction of the heliport add that while “this is definitely military infrastructure being constructed,” the new facility may also have a dual-use function to enable the movement of civilians into the remote area. The heliport, they add, enhances Chinese “defensive and offensive operations [and] their reaction capabilities increase.” This enables a speedy build-up of troops during a contingency.

The Fishtails area of Arunachal Pradesh, named after the distinctive shape of the boundary-line in this area, is comprised of Fishtail 1 and Fishtail 2. While Fishtail 1 lies in the Dibang Valley, Fishtail 2 is partly in the Anjaw district of the state. Both areas are considered ‘sensitive’, in other words, zones where China and India have differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control.

“This heliport will be a threat to key areas which are considered ‘sensitive’ here,” says Lt General Pravin Bakshi (retired), who headed the Eastern Command of the Indian Army. “I would take serious note and look to orchestrate a suitable response, if ever required, in concern with the Indian Air Force so as to prevent any ‘grey-zone’ warfare being efficiently prosecuted by the Chinese here.” Grey-Zone warfare refers to a form of conflict which falls below the threshold of conventional war while still threatening boundary lines through coercive means that threaten stability.

The heliport under construction features a 600-metre runway which can be used for rolling take-offs of helicopters, a technique used in high-altitude areas where there is less power available for helicopters to use. Despite this runway, the new heliport is situated in an area where the altitude is substantially lower than large tracts of the Tibetan plateau. This benefits helicopter operations. “While the rest of the plateau has a disadvantage because of altitude, the general altitude in this area is in the 1500 metre (approximately 5000 feet) range which allows greater payload to be carried by choppers and aircraft.”

The heliport also features at least three hangars, a sizeable apron area for helicopters to be positioned, an air traffic control facility and associated buildings and structures.

China’s construction of the new heliport comes at a time when Beijing is in the process of constructing hundreds of ‘Xiaokang’ or dual-use villages along the frontier with India. These villages are a tool for China to assert its claims in disputed areas along the Line of Actual Control. By constructing these villages and changing facts of the ground, China has been involved in what India’s late Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat referred to as “salami slicing” of territory. This has been particularly evident in the Kingdom of Bhutan, where undefended parts of its border regions, including ancestral lands of its royal family, have been physically taken over by the Chinese, who have built townships connected by an extensive road-network.

“This illustrates how China is quietly creating new facts on the ground,” says Brahma Chellaney, a leading strategic affairs expert who focusses closely on China. “The current efforts to defuse the military standoff raise the question as to what a possible deal can accomplish, given the new military realities China has created along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) since 2020.”

India, which has engaged China in protracted talks after the violent skirmishes of 2020 in Ladakh, has begun countering China’s border strategy by launching the ‘Vibrant Villages’ development project that covers 3,000 villages in four Northeastern border states, including Arunachal Pradesh. Rs 4,800 crore has been allotted for the first phase of the project. Separately, a 2,400-kilometre trans-Arunachal highway is being completed that drastically reduces travel time, particularly in Eastern Arunachal Pradesh. The highway, along with separate road projects in the state, enable connectivity to frontline Army posts as well.

Shifting pressure to the east of Arunachal Pradesh through the construction of the new heliport, however, “opens up a new vista,” says Lt General Bakshi. Despite the rapid build-up of infrastructure along the frontier, “This area remains the least developed in our area of responsibility.”

With inputs from Divyam Sharma