Nearly four years before his arrest in Belgium, wanted businessman Mehul Choksi was arrested in the Dominican Republic for illegal entry. He had then alleged that Indian agents forcibly removed him from Antigua and Barbuda, where he fled just before the Punjab National Bank fraud came to light, and took him to the Dominican Republic.

Diamantaire Mehul Choksi, who owned Gitanjali Group, is an accused in the 12,636-crore fraud at the state-run bank. He fled India in January 2018 and reached Antigua, where he had taken citizenship by investment. In May 2021, Choksi appeared in the Dominican Republic and was arrested for illegal entry. He alleged that he was abducted in Antigua, tortured and brought to the Dominican Republic on a boat.

In the aftermath of the alleged abduction, a woman’s name came up. Choksi’s wife Priti alleged that they met Barbara Jabarika, a Hungarian national, in 2020 and alleged that she was part of a honeytrap plan. Barbara trashed these allegations and reports that she was Choksi’s “girlfriend”. I have my own income and business. I don’t need his cash, support, hotel booking, fake jewellery, or anything.”

She said Choksi introduced himself as Raj and that they first met in August 2020. “Raj (Mehul Choksi) was the one who approached me, asked for my number and ‘befriended me’, totally the opposite of what his wife says,” Barbara said. She also said Choksi had told her they may meet in Cuba, suggesting he planned to move there.

Choksi, however, alleged that Barbara did not try to help him when he was being beaten up and placed on a watercraft to be taken to Dominica from Antigua and Barbuda. He also said the way Barbara behaved indicated “she was an integral part of this whole plan”.

Priti Choksi trashed Barbara’s claims that she knew Choksi as Raj. “How is it possible that despite all the media attention and public furore surrounding this case, that this lady who has an Instagram account with thousands of followers was in the dark about all this, and did not come out to speak in defence of her ‘friend’?” she said. “These bogus claims are only an attempt to present a wrong picture of my husband,” she said.

Choksi was imprisoned in the Dominican Republic for 51 days before he got relief from the British Queen’s Privy Council and returned to Antigua, foiling India’s attempts to extradite him. Later, the illegal entry charges against him in the Dominican Republic were dropped.

In March 2023, Interpol took down a Red Notice against Choksi. A Red Notice is a request to law enforcement worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition or surrender. In response to the Interpol move, the CBI said Choksi approached international forums, including the Commission for Control of Interpol’s Files, with “false claims, concocted dramatic stories and imaginary narratives” to “create diversions” because he faces possibilities of extradition to India. The CBI had also said an INTERPOL Red Notice is “neither a pre requisite nor a requirement for extradition proceedings”.

Last year, Indian agencies learned that Choksi was in Belgium, and they promptly alerted the agencies there. All documents regarding the fraud case were also shared. Belgian police arrested Choksi on Saturday and found he was trying to flee to Switzerland. Choksi’s wife Priti is a Belgian citizen. According to reports, Choksi submitted fabricated documents to get a residency card in Belgium. He also concealed that he was a citizen of India and Antigua. Earlier, in February, Choksi’s lawyer told a Mumbai court that he cannot return to India because he was in Belgium for blood cancer treatment.

Choksi’s lawyer said he will file an application in Belgium, seeking relief on health grounds. Vijay Aggarwal said a key ground for appeal will be Choksi’s health. “He is undergoing cancer treatment and wants to continue it in Switzerland. He is currently not a flight risk,” he said. The lawyer cited security concerns if Choksi is brought back to India. “We believe that as soon as he arrives, he will receive inhuman treatment. He wants to protect himself from this,” he said.

When Donald Trump pulled back on his plan to impose eye-watering tariffs on trading partners across the world, there was one key exception: China.

While the rest of the world would be given a 90-day reprieve on additional duties beyond the new 10% tariffs on all US trade partners, China would feel the squeeze even more. On April 9, 2025, Trump raised the tariff on Chinese goods to 125%.

The move, in Trump’s telling, was prompted by Beijing’s “lack of respect for global markets.” But the U.S. president may well have been smarting from Beijing’s apparent willingness to confront U.S. tariffs head on.

While many countries opted not to retaliate against Trump’s now-delayed reciprocal tariff hikes, instead favoring negotiation and dialogue, Beijing took a different tack. It responded with swift and firm countermeasures. On April 11, China dismissed Trump’s moves as a “joke” and raised its own tariff against the U.S. to 125%.

The two economies are now locked in an all-out, high-intensity trade standoff. And China is showing no signs of backing down.

And as an expert on U.S.-China relations, I wouldn’t expect China to. Unlike the first U.S.-China trade war during Trump’s initial term, when Beijing eagerly sought to negotiate with the U.S., China now holds far more leverage.

Indeed, Beijing believes it can inflict at least as much damage on the U.S. as vice versa, while at the same time expanding its global position.

A changed calculus for China

There’s no doubt that the consequences of tariffs are severe for China’s export-oriented manufacturers – especially those in the coastal regions producing furniture, clothing, toys and home appliances for American consumers.

But since Trump first launched a tariff increase on China in 2018, a number of underlying economic factors have significantly shifted Beijing’s calculus.

Crucially, the importance of the U.S. market to China’s export-driven economy has declined significantly. In 2018, at the start of the first trade war, U.S.-bound exports accounted for 19.8% of China’s total exports. In 2023, that figure had fallen to 12.8%. The tariffs may further prompt China to accelerate its “domestic demand expansion” strategy, unleashing the spending power of its consumers and strengthening its domestic economy.

And while China entered the 2018 trade war in a phase of strong economic growth, the current situation is quite different. Sluggish real estate markets, capital flight and Western “decoupling” have pushed the Chinese economy into a period of persistent slowdown.

Perhaps counterintuitively, this prolonged downturn may have made the Chinese economy more resilient to shocks. It has pushed businesses and policymakers to come to factor in the existing harsh economic realities, even before the impact of Trump’s tariffs.

Trump’s tariff policy against China may also allow Beijing a useful external scapegoat, allowing it to rally public sentiment and shift blame for the economic slowdown onto U.S. aggression.

China also understands that the U.S. cannot easily replace its dependency on Chinese goods, particularly through its supply chains. While direct U.S. imports from China have decreased, many goods now imported from third countries still rely on Chinese-made components or raw materials.

By 2022, the U.S. relied on China for 532 key product categories – nearly four times the level in 2000 – while China’s reliance on U.S. products was cut by half in the same period.

There’s a related public opinion calculation: Rising tariffs are expected to drive up prices, something that could stir discontent among American consumers, particularly blue-collar voters. Indeed, Beijing believes Trump’s tariffs risk pushing the previously strong U.S. economy toward a recession.

Potent tools for retaliation

Alongside the changed economic environments, China also holds a number of strategic tools for retaliation against the U.S.

It dominates the global rare earth supply chain – critical to military and high-tech industries – supplying roughly 72% of U.S. rare earth imports, by some estimates. On March 4, China placed 15 American entities on its export control list, followed by another 12 on April 9. Many were U.S. defense contractors or high-tech firms reliant on rare earth elements for their products.

China also retains the ability to target key U.S. agricultural export sectors such as poultry and soybeans – industries heavily dependent on Chinese demand and concentrated in Republican-leaning states. China accounts for about half of U.S. soybean exports and nearly 10% of American poultry exports. On March 4, Beijing revoked import approvals for three major U.S. soybean exporters.

And on the tech side, many U.S. companies – such as Apple and Tesla – remain deeply tied to Chinese manufacturing. Tariffs threaten to shrink their profit margins significantly, something Beijing believes can be used as a source of leverage against the Trump administration. Already, Beijing is reportedly planning to strike back through regulatory pressure on U.S. companies operating in China.

Meanwhile, the fact that Elon Musk, a senior Trump insider who has clashed with U.S. trade adviser Peter Navarro against tariffs, has major business interests in China is a particularly strong wedge that Beijing could yet exploit in an attempt to divide the Trump administration.

A strategic opening for China?

While Beijing thinks it can weather Trump’s sweeping tariffs on a bilateral basis, it also believes the U.S. broadside against its own trading partners has created a generational strategic opportunity to displace American hegemony.

Close to home, this shift could significantly reshape the geopolitical landscape of East Asia. Already on March 30 – after Trump had first raised tariffs on Beijing – China, Japan and South Korea hosted their first economic dialogue in five years and pledged to advance a trilateral free trade agreement. The move was particularly remarkable given how carefully the U.S. had worked to cultivate its Japanese and South Korean allies during the Biden administration as part of its strategy to counter Chinese regional influence. From Beijing’s perspective, Trump’s actions offer an opportunity to directly erode U.S. sway in the Indo-Pacific.

Similarly, Trump’s steep tariffs on Southeast Asian countries, which were also a major strategic regional priority during the Biden administration, may push those nations closer to China. Chinese state media announced on April 11 that President Xi Jinping will pay state visits to Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia from April 14-18, aiming to deepen “all-round cooperation” with neighboring countries. Notably, all three Southeast Asian nations were targeted with now-paused reciprocal tariffs by the Trump administration – 49% on Cambodian goods, 46% on Vietnamese exports and 24% on products from Malaysia.

Farther away from China lies an even more promising strategic opportunity. Trump’s tariff strategy has already prompted China and officials from the European Union to contemplate strengthening their own previously strained trade ties, something that could weaken the transatlantic alliance that had sought to decouple from China.

On April 8, the president of the European Commission held a call with China’s premier, during which both sides jointly condemned U.S. trade protectionism and advocated for free and open trade. Coincidentally, on April 9, the day China raised tariffs on U.S. goods to 84%, the EU also announced its first wave of retaliatory measures – imposing a 25% tariff on selected U.S. imports worth over €20 billion – but delayed implementation following Trump’s 90-day pause.

Now, EU and Chinese officials are holding talks over existing trade barriers and considering a full-fledged summit in China in July.

Finally, China sees in Trump’s tariff policy a potential weakening of the international standing of the U.S. dollar. Widespread tariffs imposed on multiple countries have shaken investor confidence in the U.S. economy, contributing to a decline in the dollar’s value.

Traditionally, the dollar and U.S. Treasury bonds have been viewed as haven assets, but recent market turmoil has cast doubt on that status. At the same time, steep tariffs have raised concerns about the health of the U.S. economy and the sustainability of its debt, undermining trust in both the dollar and U.S. Treasury.

While Trump’s tariffs will inevitably hurt parts of the Chinese economy, Beijing appears to have far more cards to play this time around. It has the tools to inflict meaningful damage on U.S. interests – and perhaps more importantly, Trump’s all-out tariff war is providing China with a rare and unprecedented strategic opportunity.

(Author: Linggong Kong, Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, Auburn University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

(Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by NDTV staff and is published from a syndicated feed.)

Post Content