The name of an Indian emigrant to Norway has cropped up in the investigation into the pager blasts aimed at Hezbollah operatives, which killed 12 people in Lebanon and left thousands injured. Now a Norwegian citizen, Rinson Jose migrated to the country from Wayanad in Kerala and reports had initially suggested that a company owned by the 37-year-old in Bulgaria was involved in the supply of the pagers to the militant group.

Initial investigations had revealed that the pagers, which had reportedly been modified by Mossad to hide three grams of explosives in each device, were manufactured by a Taiwan-based company, Gold Apollo. In a statement, the company said, however, that the pager model used in the blast, AR-924, was actually manufactured and sold by BAC Consulting KFT, a company based in Hungary’s Budapest, which had been authorised to use its trademark. 

Then, on Thursday, two days after the pagers exploded, Bulgarian state security agency DANS said it was coordinating with the country’s interior ministry and probing the role of a company, whose name was later revealed to be Norta Global Ltd. The company, which was registered in Sofia in 2022, was found to be owned by a Norwegian, Rinson Jose. 

A day later, on Friday, however, DANS said the pagers used in the blasts in Lebanon were not imported, exported or manufactured in Bulgaria. 

“Following verifications, it has been indisputably established that no communication equipment corresponding to those that exploded on September 17 was imported, exported or manufactured in Bulgaria,” the agency was quoted as saying by news agency AFP.

It added that the company and its owner had “not carried out any transactions linked to the sale or purchase of the merchandise” or that “fall under laws on terrorism financing”.

Police in Norway’s Oslo said they have opened a “preliminary investigation into the information that has emerged”.

Wayanad To Oslo

According to a report by news agency IANS, Jose went to Norway to pursue higher studies a few years ago. He briefly worked in London before going back to Oslo. 

According to his LinkedIn page, he has also worked for almost five years in digital customer support for Norwegian press group DN Media, AFP reported. DN Media told newspaper Verdens Gang that he has been on an overseas work trip since Tuesday and that they have not been able to reach him.

Relatives told IANS that Jose is settled with his wife in Oslo and has a twin brother based in London. “We speak daily over the phone. However, for the last three days, we have had no contact with Jose. He is a straightforward person and we trust him fully. He will not be part of any wrongdoing. He may have been trapped in these blasts,” Thankachen, a relative of the 37-year-old, told the news agency on Friday. 

He added that they have not been able to contact Jose’s wife either. 

Norta Global, founded by Jose, declared a revenue of $ 725,000 (approximately Rs 6 crore) for consulting activities outside the European Union last year. 

(With inputs from agencies)
 

An Indian embassy official has been allegedly found dead under mysterious circumstances inside the mission premises in Washington.

According to the news agency PTI, local police and the Secret Service are currently investigating the incident that occurred on Wednesday, including the possibility of suicide.

The Embassy confirmed the death in an official statement on Friday but did not give any further details.

“With deep regret, we wish to confirm that a member of the Embassy of India passed away on the evening of 18th September 2024. We are in touch with all relevant agencies and members of the family to ensure the swift transfer of the remains to India,” it said.

“Additional details regarding the deceased are not being released out of concern for the family’s privacy. Our thoughts and prayers are with the family in this time of grief. We thank you for your understanding,” it added.

It’s June, 2009. The streets of Tehran have erupted in protests over the results of a presidential election. The incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has emerged victorious with an overwhelming majority against Mir-Hossein Mousavi. Protesters alleged a fraudulent victory. Among them is a woman named Neda Agha-Soltan, who on her way to join the main protests, parked her car at some distance from the gathering and stepped out as the vehicle’s air conditioner was not working. As she breathed in the fresh air, a sniper belonging to a government-funded militia took aim and shot her square in the chest. She was dead.

While this was unfolding in Tehran, around 300 kilometres to the south at the Natanz nuclear facility, the heart of Iran’s nuclear program – ‘strange’ things were happening. Just days after Neda’s death, the CIA reportedly received approval to initiate a cyber operation against this facility. The operation involved uploading a sophisticated piece of malware, known as Stuxnet, directly onto Iranian hardware. This malware had been in development for years, a collaborative effort between the United States and Israel, and represented the world’s first digital weapon.

Stuxnet: The Genesis

Stuxnet was not a new presence in Iran’s nuclear infrastructure; it had been causing disruptions for years. However, this new version was designed to deliver a decisive blow. 

The story of Stuxnet’s development and deployment began years earlier. The inception of Stuxnet can be traced back to the early 2000s, during a period of heightened tension between Iran and Western nations over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The Bush administration, concerned about Iran’s potential to develop nuclear weapons, sought unconventional methods to impede Tehran’s progress. Thus, the covert operation codenamed ‘Olympic Games’ was born. This initiative, involving close collaboration between the CIA, the NSA, and Israel’s Mossad, aimed to create a digital weapon capable of physically disrupting Iran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities.

Stuxnet was not an ordinary piece of malware. Its design reflected a level of sophistication unprecedented in the realm of cyber weapons. The malware targeted Siemens Step7 software, used to control industrial equipment, specifically focusing on the centrifuges at Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment facility. These centrifuges, essential for enriching uranium, operated at high speeds and required precise control to function correctly.

Stuxnet: The Execution

The US built a replica of Iran’s nuclear facility in its Oak Ridge facility in the state of Tennessee, where they meticulously studied the centrifuges to understand how to sabotage them without detection. In 2007, the first version of Stuxnet was released, targeting these centrifuges by preventing the release of pressure through the valves, causing the uranium gas to solidify and the centrifuges to spin out of control and ultimately self-destruct.

Iran’s nuclear facility was air-gapped, meaning its network was offline, so Stuxnet had to be introduced via an inside agent using a USB drive. The malware operated undetected, using a rootkit to hide its presence and stolen digital certificates to appear as legitimate commands. Despite its effectiveness, initial versions of Stuxnet only slowed Iran’s progress, and did not sabotage it entirely.

In response, US researchers developed a more aggressive version of Stuxnet, using four zero-day exploits and stolen private keys to sign its commands. This version could spread rapidly, even across air-gapped networks, and reprogram the centrifuges to destroy themselves while masking the sabotage as hardware malfunctions.

Stuxnet: The Implications

An insider at Natanz introduced this new version of Stuxnet, and it quickly spread throughout the facility’s network. However, its aggressive nature led to unintended consequences: the malware spread beyond Natanz, infecting computers across Iran and eventually the globe. The CIA, realising the uncontrollable spread of Stuxnet, decided to continue with the operation, hoping it would remain undetected within Natanz.

Their hopes were dashed when cybersecurity firm Symantec discovered Stuxnet and published a detailed report on the malware. Iran soon realised the extent of the cyber attack and took measures to protect their nuclear program. Despite the setbacks caused by Stuxnet, Iran vowed to continue its nuclear ambitions.

One of the earlier hints of Stuxnet’s existence emerged in June 2010 when a Belarusian cybersecurity firm discovered an unusual piece of malware on an Iranian computer. As cybersecurity experts from around the world began analysing the code, they were astounded by its complexity and purpose. 

Impact On Iran’s Nuclear Program

Stuxnet’s impact on Iran’s nuclear program was significant but not immediately catastrophic. By 2009, Iran had installed over 7,000 centrifuges at Natanz, but Stuxnet caused approximately 1,000 of these to fail. The disruptions forced Iran to temporarily halt its enrichment activities and replace the damaged equipment, delaying its nuclear ambitions by several months to years.

The Iranian government, initially oblivious to the cause of the centrifuge failures, eventually recognised the cyber intrusion. Publicly, Iran downplayed the impact of Stuxnet, but internally, it spurred significant investment in cybersecurity measures and the development of offensive cyber capabilities.

Over the following years, targeted assassinations of key Iranian nuclear scientists further crippled their program. Car bombings and other attacks eliminated many of the leaders involved, including the director of the Natanz facility.

Stuxnet: Global Fallout

Stuxnet did not confine itself to Iran. It spread to other countries, including India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, affecting industrial systems worldwide. In India, several critical infrastructure facilities,  reportedly infecting as many as 80,000 computers. Several power plants and manufacturing units were also found to be vulnerable to similar attacks.

In 2013, India adopted the National Cyber Security Policy which focused on “protection of information infrastructure and preservation of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information in cyberspace”. The following year, the Centre announced the formation of the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre to further safeguard India’s cyber security space.